I'm a fourth-year PhD student in Economics at The University of Chicago.

Email: takumahabu@uchicago.edu

Fields: Microeconomic theory; Behavioural economics; Organisational economics

CV: See About.

Updated: 3 May 2021

# Unpublished

Knowing the Informed Player’s Payoffs and Simple Play in Repeated Games (PDF)

with Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid

We revisit the classic model of two-player repeated games with undiscounted utility, observable actions, and one-sided incomplete information, and further assume the informed player has state-independent preferences. We show the informed player can attain a payoff in equilibrium if and only if she can attain it in the simple class of equilibria first studied by Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1968), in which information is only revealed in the game’s initial stages. This sufficiency result does not extend to the uninformed player’s equilibrium payoff set.

Optimal contracting with a Luce agent (PDF) MPhil thesis

I study how introducing a boundedly rational agent to an otherwise standard optimal contracting problem alters the characteristics of the optimal contract. Specifically, I assume that the agent’s response function follows the Luce model such that he is more likely to undertake an action that gives him a higher (expected) utility. When there is moral hazard, optimal contracts exhibit the usual monotone contract property "in reverse"; i.e., the principal does not find it optimal to pay the agent always less when she observes a better outcome. This finding is similar to that from the standard model with a fully rational agent.

# Work in progress

The power of semi-public communication (Extended abstract, draft available soon)

A manager in an organisation can communicate with workers privately, publicly or semi-publicly by partitioning workers into groups and talking publicly among workers in each group but privately across groups. In a cheap-talk environment in which the manager has transparent motives and additively separable preferences, I show that optimal partitions do not generally correspond to public or private communication and that the manager strictly benefits from the power to communicate semi-publicly by strategically forming differently diverse groups of workers. I demonstrate that the problem of finding optimal partitions is equivalent to a problem that is known to be computationally difficult to solve (and to characterise). Nevertheless, I prove that any optimal partitions involve separating workers who need to be persuaded from those that do not need to be persuaded. I also provide a class of optimal partitions under some restrictive assumptions that limiting the power of semi-public communication.

Selection in Information Design

with Andy Choi

# Publications

Money Illusion and its Implication on Unemployment (link) Undergraduate dissertation

Undergraduate Economic Review, 2011, 7:1, 10.

The paper discusses the implication of money illusion on persistent unemployment. A particular form of money illusion is assumed and this is modeled into the efficiency wage theory while separating the analysis into nominal and real frames. The model shows that the level of unemployment in the nominal and the real frame are likely to be different and that the government has an incentive to provide a signaling mechanism to the workers to reduce unemployment levels. Additionally, the government is shown to have an incentive to announce unemployment rates.