I'm a fifth-year PhD student in Economics at the University of Chicago. 


Email: takumahabu@uchicago.edu

Fields: Microeconomic theory; Organisational economics; Behavioural economics


CV: See About


Updated: 28 May 2021


Unpublished

Knowing the Informed Player’s Payoffs and Simple Play in Repeated Games (SSRN)

with Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid 

We revisit the classic model of two-player repeated games with undiscounted utility, observable actions, and one-sided incomplete information, and further assume the informed player has state-independent preferences. We show the informed player can attain a payoff in equilibrium if and only if she can attain it in the simple class of equilibria first studied by Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1968), in which information is only revealed in the game’s initial stages. This sufficiency result does not extend to the uninformed player’s equilibrium payoff set.


Optimal contracting with a Luce agent (PDFMPhil thesis

I study how introducing a boundedly rational agent to an otherwise standard optimal contracting problem alters the characteristics of the optimal contract. Specifically, I assume that the agent’s response function follows the Luce model such that he is more likely to undertake an action that gives him a higher (expected) utility. When there is moral hazard, optimal contracts exhibit the usual monotone contract property "in reverse"; i.e., the principal does not find it optimal to pay the agent always less when she observes a better outcome. This finding is similar to that from the standard model with a fully rational agent. 

Work in progress

The power of semi-public communication (SSRN; Slides)

I study how an informed manager can benefit from cheap-talk communication by strategically forming diverse groups of uninformed, heterogenous workers. Optimal grouping, or partition, of workers trades off the benefit from gaining credibility through having greater diversity in each group against the cost from the inability to tailor communication among workers in the same group. Public and private communication are restrictions on the partitions the manager can adopt, and the manager prefers semi-public communication whenever there is a possibility to benefit from differently diverse groups of workers. I show that it is optimal for the manager to separate workers who need to be persuaded from those that do not, and I derive further properties of optimal partitions when workers are single minded and when workers have preferences over a spectrum of project types.


Selection in Information Design

with Andy Choi

In many applications of Bayesian persuasion, the state space represents agent types so that the choice of experiment by the designer can be expected to have a selection effect. For example, the choice of grading policy for a class is likely to affect the type of students who choose to take the class. Similarly, a seller may not participate on a platform because the platform has a tough rating system. We study how accounting for selection effects in Bayesian persuasion problems affects the optimal payoffs and communication strategy by explicitly modelling the agent’s participation decision.


Publications

Money Illusion and its Implication on Unemployment (link) Undergraduate dissertation

Undergraduate Economic Review, 2011, 7:1, 10.

The paper discusses the implication of money illusion on persistent unemployment. A particular form of money illusion is assumed and this is modeled into the efficiency wage theory while separating the analysis into nominal and real frames. The model shows that the level of unemployment in the nominal and the real frame are likely to be different and that the government has an incentive to provide a signaling mechanism to the workers to reduce unemployment levels. Additionally, the government is shown to have an incentive to announce unemployment rates.


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